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Activity title

Defending Democracy in the Information Environment – Foundations and Roles for Defence

Activity Reference

SAS-177

Panel

SAS

Security Classification

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Status

Active

Activity type

RTG

Start date

2022-10-01T00:00:00Z

End date

2025-10-01T00:00:00Z

Keywords

Deterrence, Disinformation, Social Media, Strategic Communication

Background

Currently, democracy is globally under threat, in a trend that has been widely linked to digital and social media technologies’ impacts on public and political communication. The rise of globalized online media have provided undemocratic, anti-democratic and authoritarian actors and entities with numerous ways to interfere in, influence, distort and control public conversations around the world in keeping with their own strategic objectives, which may include and depend upon degrading of public trust in democratic institutions and processes. Adversarial activities of interfering in and degrading democracy are typically conducted under-the-threshold of war, and include introducing and amplifying disinformation and divisive narratives in spaces of public conversation such as social media platforms, as well as harassing and attempting to censor constructive participants. These practices can help fuel the destruction of public consensus around facts, as well as thoughtful deliberation on policies, while more broadly attacking social and psychological foundations of cognitive security that allow people to think clearly and deliberate safely about their perspectives, values and interests. A vexing challenge is posed for how democratic countries are to counter and mitigate sub-threshold attacks on democracy while maintaining democratic principles such as free and open expression and privacy for citizens. The current challenge of defending democracy against attack through activities in the information environment is frequently described as a whole-of-government one, though the roles played by different government departments is highly various across the alliance. For their part, Defence Departments and Armed Forces tend to be typically highly aware of adversarial activities and threats in the information environment, and to have strong strategic concerns about the downstream effect of these activities on national security, national sovereignty, in some cases national defence. Defence Departments and Armed Forces also have a traditional and ongoing requirement to counter adversarial influence activities and propaganda in operational environments, and so retain experience, concepts, processes and tools for doing so. Yet definition of circumstances in which Defence Departments and Armed Forces should be involved in defending democracy, and of specific roles they can and should play, remains imprecise and incoherent, allowing many barriers to Defence’s contributing in this urgent domain to stand. One barrier preventing Defence and Military involvement from contributing to countering these challenges is military-civil conventions that restrict Defence Departments and Armed Forces from intervening in domestic concerns in the absence of a declared war or specific jurisdictional invitation, thereby precluding defence mobilization against under-the-threshold adversarial attacks. Another barrier is a longstanding relationship between war and propaganda, which tends to elevate public suspicion towards Defence Department and Armed Forces interventions in the sphere of information and communications. Nonetheless, looking around the alliance, there are several instances of governments indirectly and directly linking Defence mandates with the projects of defending democracies, along with the cognitive security of citizens’ ability to play a role in those democracies. Questions of when, how, and where Defence Departments and Armed Forces can become involved in this massive and pressing challenge of defending democracy thus remain open ones.

Objectives

The purpose of this RTG would be to explore imperatives and challenges around incorporating Defence Departments and Armed Forces in the existential project of defending democracy, with a view to making use of and expanding opportunities and overcoming barriers.

Topics

1. Undertake a project of foundational analysis to delineate the basic principles—both traditional and more recent—upon which democratic societies rest; and to characterize, diagnose, and forecast the current attack on and threat to democracy posed by anti-democratic adversaries in the information environment. This foundational analyses may incorporate Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats analysis to better understand why current information and communication technological conditions pose threats and opportunities to democracy, as well as democracies’ strengths and weaknesses in the current technological context; and/or a center-of-gravity analysis to better understand the weaknesses in democracy that lead it to be exploited in this technological context, and how it can be safeguarded. 2. Elucidate and advance potential roles that can be played by Defence Departments and Armed Forces in national and international efforts to characterize and counter the generalized attack on democracy currently being faced, as well as individual instances of it, and to manage and mitigate the threat such attacks pose. First, a review would be undertaken of current linkages being made by alliance governments between Defence mandates and activities and the objective of defending and protecting democracy. Based on this review, we would attempt to define, advance, and advise upon some possible roles that Defence Departments and Armed Forces already integrally hold and could more overtly assume in the defence of democracy. These roles could include: a) Incorporating a mission of defending democracy and democratic values into strategic and operational mission statements, planning, narratives and development of tactics, along with strategic, operational, and other forms of communications; b) Developing and applying best practices for promoting and reflecting a mission of defending democracy and democratic values in strategic communications and other proactive messaging oriented at publics; c) Maintaining and reinforcing democratic principles as a value at the heart of defence conduct and activities, while better understanding what trade-offs in democratic conduct may sometimes arise for armed forces active at various points along the conflict spectrum, and considering how these trade-offs could be better managed and communicated about; d) Developing information environment analysis tools, processes, and products capable of baselining democratic conditions and identifying when these are under threat or attack, particularly by adversaries in under-the-threshold and hybrid warfare contexts; e) Developing threat assessments through the use of d) to inform whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance activities when democratic conditions are observed to be under attack; f) Creating a playbook and further developing and/or testing of audience-appropriate, democracy-bolstering information, education, engagement and other communication and media interventions and best practices that defence departments armed forces, or other institutional entities, could undertake in the IE to pre-empt or mitigate identified threats to democracy, in keeping with their respective mandates; g) Establishing principles for the development and application of d), e), and f) that respect democratic principles, norms and laws and provide guidance for working appropriately and legally with social media data and companies. 3. Specify what governmental structures, relationships, processes, and understandings are needed to facilitate Defence Departments playing a helpful and effective role in defending democracy, both internationally and domestically.

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